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Abstract
In this paper, we propose and evaluate a distributed protocol to
manage trust diffusion in ad hoc networks. In this protocol, each node
i maintains a “trust value” about an other node j which is computed
both as a result of the exchanges with node j itself and as a function
of the opinion that other nodes have about j. These two aspects are
respectively weighted by a trust index that measures the trust quality
the node has in its own experiences and by a trust index representing
the trust the node has in the opinions of the other nodes. Simulations
have been realized to validate the robustness of this protocol against
three kinds of attacks: simple coalitions, Trojan attacks and detonator
attacks.
Keywords: trust diffusion, ad hoc network, interaction graph.
1 Introduction and preliminaries
Ad hoc networks can be defined as collections of mobile nodes, distributed
and independent, being able to communicate by radio transmission and to
self-organise. They constitute networks with unstable infrastructure. Since
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the neighbourhood of every node changes over time, it is important to de-
velop protocols that will help each node to identify reliably other nodes with
which it can interact safely.
Let us present two definitions of the concept of trust given by the Web-
ster’s classic 1913: “Firm reliance on the integrity, ability, or character of a
person or thing” and“Certainty based on past experience”. Trust is therefore
a natural notion acquired and systematically used by anyone to decide if an
exchange with somebody else is conceivable or not. Let us remark that the
trust we can have in somebody usually depends on the personal knowledges
we have about the person and also on his/her reputation according to other
people we have already met. This is usually the way that trust diffuses in
human groups. For example, a researcher can trust the scientific opinion of
a colleague while not trusting the opinion of the same colleague about the
work of other scientists. The idea of this paper is to transfer this human
trust diffusion protocol to ad hoc networks. Literature about trust manage-
ment in P2P systems [BB04, KSGM03] and Web Services [RZ01] presents
some solutions using both personal and external opinions. However, these
protocols do not offer protection against attacks made by a set of nodes
working in coalition, for example diffusing wrong positive opinions about a
dishonest node (called Trojan attack further in the paper). That is why we
propose to study in this paper a management policy that also measures the
trust quality by introducing a new level of trust that adds weights both on
a node own experiences and on external knowledges this node has received
from the others.
Let us call efficient a protocol that leads to prevent bad interaction
and reliable a protocol that aims at favouring good interactions. This work
consists in creating, studying and validating by simulations a new efficient
distributed trust diffusion protocol for ad hoc networks using the double
level of trust described above.
Section 2 presents and explains the trust diffusion protocol. Some re-
sults obtained on this protocol are exposed in Section 3. In particular, this
section shows how the protocol can resist to three different types of attacks.
Section 4 gives perspectives of this work.
2 Trust diffusion protocol
Because of the constraints inherent to ad hoc networks, the proposed
model has to be based on three fundamental concepts: information decentrali-
sation, diffusion and management of trust histories.
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In this section, we first present the different attributes used by the pro-
tocol in order to have the requested features to adapt on ad hoc networks.
Then, we expose the protocol dynamics.
2.1 Protocol attributes
In order to respect the constraints induced by ad hoc networks, all nodes
have to store their own knowledges about the others. This subsection intro-
duces the different attributes that compose the notion of knowledge used in
the proposed protocol and that a node i has about a node j at time t.
• Trust mark, denoted by tmi,j(t) ∈ [0, 1].
Node i stores a trust mark valued in [0, 1] about node j with which it
has already interacted. This trust mark is used to know if an interaction
has a good chance to be benefic. It is updated as a function of two major
information: the own experience of node i and the external knowledges node
i has obtained from other nodes during past interactions. It is initialized to
1
2 .
• Trust index in trust mark, denoted by itmi,j(t) ∈ [0, 1].
Node i stores a trust index about its trust mark about node j. This
trust index gives an indication about the reliability of the trust mark it has
about node j. It is initialized to 12 .
• List of external trust knowledges, denoted by eti,j(t) with eti,j(t)[k] ∈
[0, 1] and k ∈ [0, n].
Node i stores about node j a list of external trust marks. Such a list
contains the trust marks owned by j about other nodes. This list has been
transmitted to node i during the last interaction between i and j (during
this interaction, i has symmetrically transmitted its trust marks to j). This
list is initialized to ∅. Moreover, when nodes i and j symmetrically transmit
to each other their trust marks, they also transmit their trust indices in
these trust marks. These lists of trust indices are called lists of external
trust indices in trust knowledges. Such a list owned by node i about node j
is denoted at time t by ieli,j(t) with ieli,j(t)[k] ∈ [0, 1] and k ∈ [0, n] and is
initialized to ∅.
• Trust index in list of external trust knowledges, denoted by ieti,j(t) ∈
[0, 1].
Node i stores a trust index about each list of external knowledges it has
received from other nodes. Such trust indices give an indication about the
reliability of these lists and are initialized to 12 .
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• List of past interactions marks, denoted by pili,j(t) with pili,j(t)[k] ∈
{0, 1} and k ∈ [0, θ].
Node i stores about node j a list of marks encoding the results of its
θ (where θ is bounded by θmax to avoid side effects) last interactions with
the node. If the interaction was a success (the transmitted data was the
expected data), the mark is 1, and it is 0 otherwise. The marks included in
this list correspond to the own experience of node i about node j and are
used to compute trust mark for future interactions. It is initialized to ∅.
We will call positive (resp. negative) an attribute (valued in [0, 1]) that
is greater or equal to (resp. less than) 12 .
2.2 Protocol dynamics
We describe in this subsection the updating methods of the protocol
attributes described above. First, let us note that the list of external trust
knowledges (et) and the list of external trust indices in trust knowledges (iel)
are simply transmitted through the network by nodes at each interaction.
Then, the update of the list of past interactions is done as follows: when
node i asks node j for data transmission, if the list of past interactions of i
is not full, the mark affected to this new interaction is placed at the end of
the list; otherwise, the first mark in the list is removed and the new mark
is placed at the end. Now, let us focus on other attributes that need more
complicated updating functions.
• Trust marks
When node i wishes to interact with node j at time t, it has not only to
rely on its own knowledges but also on the external knowledges about node
j it has already received from the other nodes. Thus, to update its trust
mark about node j, node i needs to evaluate two different data. First, we
define the personal knowledges PK as the simple average of the results of
past interactions node i had with node j. So:
PKt+1i,j =
∑θ
k=1 pili,j(t)[k]
θ
Now, let us also define the external knowledges. Let S∗ be the set of
nodes k such as {k 6= i, j, ieti,k(t) > 12 , eti,k(t)[j] < 12 , ieli,k(t)[j] > 12}. At
time t + 1, the external knowledges EK that node i has about node j are
computed as:
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EKt+1i,j =
1
|S∗|
n∑
k=1
S∗
eti,k(t)[j].
The choice made here is to average only the bad opinions other nodes
have about node j. Of course, we will restrict to nodes in which we trust
the opinion and who themselves trust their own opinion about node j. Note
that this choice leads the protocol to be efficient rather than reliable.
Now, we update the trust mark by simply taking the weighted sum of
these two knowledge values:
tmi,j(t + 1) =
ε.[θ × PKt+1i,j ]+
(E)︷ ︸︸ ︷
ζ.[θmax × EKt+1i,j ]
ε.θ+ζ.θmax︸ ︷︷ ︸
iff (E)6=0
where ε and ζ are two parameters managing the weight of personal and
external knowledges. So, the more ζ has a high value compared to ε, the
more the diffusion will be fast. However, ε and ζ have to be well balanced to
prevent the fact a node is easily disturbed if it has a majority of dishonest
neighbours. Let us note that, if these two parameters are equal, external
knowledges weight is greater than personal knowledges weight when the θmax
first interactions have not already been executed, because θmax is the upper
bound of θ. It seems to be reasonable to think that, when a node has few
personal knowledges about an other with which it wants to interact, external
knowledges are more important in its decision.
This trust marks evolution method shows that this protocol can not be
less efficient than another one which does not implement trust diffusion.
Indeed, if an interaction between two nodes i and j is possible, when i
updates its trust mark about j, it can not obtain a higher new mark than
one obtained only with its past interactions with j since it only uses negative
external knowledges.
• Trust indices in personal trust marks
The updating method of the trust mark index (when i asks j for an
interaction at time t+1) is the following. After having computed E(pili,j(t))
and σ(pili,j(t)) where E and σ refer respectively to the arithmetic average
and the standard deviation, the new value of the trust mark index is obtained
by a threshold algorithm. So, we fix a threshold named ωitm and we verify
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if the new trust mark tmi,j(t+ 1) is in
]E(pili,j(t)) − ωitm ; E(pili,j(t)) + ωitm[
The index itm grows if α is in this range of values and decreases oth-
erwise. In each case, updates are proportional to σ(pili,j(t)); however, in
order to go one step further in the “efficiency” direction, we have chosen the
decreasing function to be faster than the increasing one.
• Trust indices in external trust marks
Node i will use the newly calculated trust mark on node j to adjust the
trust index it has about the external trust knowledges stored for each other
node. In other words, for each other node k, node i compares its new trust
mark about j to the opinion k has about j. The more different (resp. close)
it is, the more node i decreases (resp. increases) its trust index on the list of
external knowledges given by k. A threshold algorithm (where the threshold
is named ωiet) is used here too. When i interacts with j, we consider the
belonging of each eti,k(t)[j] to the following range of values:
]tmi,j(t + 1) − ωiet ; tmi,j(t + 1) + ωiet[
If eti,k(t)[j] is in this range of values, the index ieti,k(t) grows, otherwise
it decreases. There also, the decreasing goes faster than the growth.
2.3 Decision to interact
At time t+1, if node i wishes to interact with node j, it verifies its trust
mark about node j and decides to realize the interaction only if this trust
mark is positive.
3 Simulations
In this section, we present the simulations that we have done on the trust
diffusion protocol presented above (called Trudi) and compare the results of
the latter to the so-called β-protocol in which nodes do not transmit their
knowledges about other nodes. We are going to evaluate the efficiency of the
protocols by measuring three parameters: (i) the number of honest nodes
succeeding in identifying the dishonest nodes; (ii) the total number of bad
interactions (transmitted data are not the expected ones) that the dishonest
nodes succeeded to do; (iii) in some cases, we also measure the number of
interactions needed for the honest nodes to identify the dishonest ones.
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Let us precise the meaning of honest and dishonest we will use in the
following. We will call action-dishonest (resp. action-honest) a node that
wishes to give to every other unexpected data (resp. expected data) and
opinion-dishonest (resp. opinion-honest) a node that wishes to give wrong
opinions (resp. correct opinions) about some nodes to many others. A node
is called dishonest if it is either action-dishonest or opinion-dishonest and
totally-dishonest if it is both action-dishonest and opinion-dishonest.
Moreover, a trust protocol is called coherent if, when a little proportion
of the system actors is action-dishonest, the honest ones succeed in the
detection of those latter.
We will start by describing the simulation protocol used in the study
before exposing some of the obtained results.
3.1 Simulation protocol
In order to run simulations not to far from real interactions in ad hoc
networks, we are going to make the hypothesis that if we observe the set of
interactions in the network after a sufficient amount of time, we will observe
a network close either to a social network or to a complete network (where
each node has interacted at least once with any other one). A social net-
work is the personal or professional set of relationships between individuals.
It has been shown [AB02, New03] that these networks very often present
the following characteristics: their degree distribution follows a power law
(the probability that a node has a degree k is a decreasing power of k);
they present a clustering coefficient (the probability for two nodes having
a common neighbour to be connected) significantly higher than for classi-
cal random networks [SW98]. Of course, there is no evidence that these
social networks precisely corresponds to the reality, but it makes sense to
suppose that interactions in ad hoc networks will share some features with
interactions in social networks.
In order to run simulations, that will lead at the end to such interaction
networks, we determine the interaction graph a priori and we then realize
the interactions on this graph. Thanks to this method, we control the final
shape of the interactions superposition. Because of the above hypothesis,
the chosen graphs are either power law degree distribution graphs with high
clustering coefficient (such a network will be called “social network” in the
following) or complete graphs.
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3.2 Simulations results
The results presented in this subsection come from simulations of 1000000
interactions on 100 nodes networks.
In the first simulation, there is only one action-dishonest node which
sends bad data with probability 15 and no opinion-dishonest node. In the so-
cial network, this node is given the highest degree. We measure the average
and maximum number of interactions realized by the other nodes with this
action-dishonest one. In Table 1, which presents the results of this simula-
tion, we observe that Trudi is significantly better than the β-protocol. In-
deed, the perception of dishonesty is about 45 times faster with Trudi than
with the β-protocol. This result can be explained by the nature of trust
diffusion in Trudi. Only negative marks and opinions are used to realize
the updates of the protocol attributes. Therefore, as the weight of exter-
nal knowledges is always more important than this of personal knowledges,
honest nodes perceive quasi-directly the dishonesty.
Another simulation has been run by placing the dishonest node on the
lowest degree node. In this case, there is no real difference between the
two protocols because of the too small connectivity of the node. Thus, the
interest of the protocol depends on the probability dishonest nodes have to
give bad interactions and on the place of dishonesty in the network, an effect
that we will call topology dependence.
Table 1: Comparison of Trudi and the β-protocol after a simple attack.
Trudi β-protocol
Avg ; Max 3.38 ; 10 153.04 ; ∼ 420
Let us now assume that some nodes make a coalition in order to attack
the network, i.e. to use their knowledge about the protocol to break its
efficiency or reliability. We are going to present in the following some results
describing the effects that such an attack can have, with and without the
Trudi protocol.
• Simple coalition attacks
A simple coalition attack manages a group of nodes in which the members
are honest with each other but totally-dishonest with nodes that are not a part
of the group, i.e. they protect themselves by giving positive opinions about
the group members outside the group.
We have run simulations of this type of attack on complete networks. In
each simulation, we have increased the size of the group of dishonest nodes
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(which send bad data with probability 15 ) to focus on the minimal size this
group must have to destabilise the network, i.e. at least one honest node
does not succeed in perceiving all the dishonest ones.
Table 2: Comparison of Trudi and the β-protocol after coalition attacks.
Number of dishonest nodes in the group Trudi β-protocol
40
√ ×
50
√ ×
60
√ ×
70 × ×
80 × ×
Table 2 shows that Trudi is extremely robust against simple coalitions con-
trary to the β-protocol. With Trudi, the system can actually be destabilised
only if the rate of good interactions is much less than the rate of bad interac-
tions provided by dishonest nodes. Let us illustrate these results on a simple
example which models a complete network where every dishonest node has
a probability of 15 to provide a bad interaction. At each interaction, an
edge has a probability of 19900 to be chosen (the interactions from i to j and
from j to i are differentiated). So, when only thirty nodes are honest, the
probability for two honest nodes to interact is 30×299900 ≈ 0.0878. When forty
nodes are honest, this probability is 40×399900 ≈ 0.1575. So, in the second case,
the system is not destabilised because the rate of good knowledges diffusion
is close to the rate of bad interactions provided by dishonest nodes. This
explanation has been verified by other simulations.
Moreover, note that the results presented in Table 2 are also valid for
social networks despite the topology-dependence.
Let us now considerer more sophisticated attacks.
• Trojan attacks
A Trojan attack (by analogy to the mythical war of Troy) manages a
group of nodes where one of them (Ulysses) is honest inside the group and
totally-dishonest outside the group. Ulysses is protected by the other members
of the group, i.e. they are action-honest but they always provide positive
opinion to the honest nodes about Ulysses.
For this attack, two simulations have been executed (illustrating proto-
cols robustness both on complete and social networks) to see the number
of bad interactions (nbi) realized by Ulysses (which sends bad data with
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probability 15) and the maximum number of interactions (mni) executed by
a honest node with Ulysses before perceiving its dishonesty.
Table 3: Comparison of Trudi and the β-protocol after Trojan attacks.
Type of network and Trudi β-protocol
Ulysses error probability
Complete network - 20% nbi = 52 ; mni = 8 nbi = 1233 ; mni = 130
Social network - 20% nbi = 14 ; mni = 25 nbi = 344 ; mni ∼ 900
In the second simulation, Ulysses is the highest degree node and is protected
by 9 high degree nodes. Table 3 validates the robustness of Trudi against
Trojan attacks on complete networks as well as on social networks. Howe-
ver, other simulations where the dishonest group takes place on nodes of
lowest degrees have shown that Trudi efficiency is not really significantly
more interesting than one of the β-protocol. These results confirm that
topology dependence is the main factor of the interest of the protocol in
social networks.
• Detonator attacks
A detonator attack is a Trojan attack where the dishonesty of Ulysses is
started only after a determined time which is called the detonation time.
Our objective is to determine how many bad interactions (nbi) are pro-
vided by Ulysses, after its detonation, to be recognised as a mistrustable
node and how many honest nodes (nhn) succeed in perceiving the dishon-
esty of Ulysses.
Table 4: Comparison of Trudi and the β-protocol after detonator attacks.
Number of interaction Trudi β-protocol
after the detonation
Complete network nbi = 836 ; nhn = 19 nbi = 837 ; nhn = 12
500000
Complete network nbi = 1051 ; nhn = 75 nbi = 1411 ; nhn = 27
900000
Social network nbi = 419 ; nhn = 15 nbi = 657 ; nhn = 15
900000
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Two simulations have been run to show the robustness of the two protocols
against detonator attacks in complete networks where Ulysses sends bad
data with probability 15 and is protected by 9 other nodes.
The first (resp. the second) simulation illustrates this type of attack
where Ulysses becomes dishonest after the 500000th (resp. 100000th) inter-
action. Table 4 shows that a too little number of interactions executed after
the detonation of Ulysses node prevents many honest ones to perceive its
dishonesty. Indeed, as the interactions are chosen randomly in the n(˙n− 1)
possible, in a 100 nodes system, 9900 (≈ 10000) different interactions exist.
Consequently, an edge between a given node and Ulysses is potentially cho-
sen fifty times in the first simulation. It is not sufficient for the given node
to detect the dishonesty of Ulysses because of two reasons. Firstly, the given
node has already a positive opinion about Ulysses and, secondly, the latter
has a too small probability to provide bad interactions (p = 15). The second
line of Table 4 validates this hypothesis. If we focus on the number of bad
interactions, we can conclude our protocol is interesting because it provides
a mean of 11.68 of bad interactions to each honest node.
Then, another simulation with the same features than the second one
has been run to show the robustness of the two protocols against these
attacks in social networks. Ulysses is here the node with the highest degree
(with 15 honest neighbours). The last line of Table 4 shows that, with the
two protocols, all Ulysses neighbours succeed in perceiving its dishonnesty.
However, with Trudi, Ulysses node gives less bad data than with the β-
protocol. Moreover, if we focus on the total number of interactions realized
by the 15 neighbours of Ulysses after the detonation time, we see that this
number is approximately three times more important with the β-protocol
than with Trudi.
4 Conclusion and perspectives
The results presented in this paper show that such a trust diffusion
protocol could have interesting efficiency properties. Besides, it could apply
not only in ad hoc networks but also in other networks. It could be of
interest in Internet and P2P systems. For example, it could be useful to
measure trust users give to web sites and could broadcast sites dishonesty.
However, to obtain such protocols, improvements have to be done.
In particular, future research should focus on the reduction of the size of
the transmitted messages because the protocols “lightness” is a primordial
point to avoid the network surcharge. So, we should try to find a good
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balance between reducing the transmitted messages size and the interest of
the diffusion principle. Different solutions could be imagined. For example,
since the goal of the protocol is to ensure efficiency, we could only diffuse
the information about bad behaving nodes. Another solution would be to
diffuse only a proportion (function of the network size) of these negative
knowledges. Such hypotheses should be tested via new simulations processes
to be validated.
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